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Case No. 20030533-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from his conviction for retail theft, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (2003).1 This court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2003). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Does a jewelry store owner's testimony that a shop-lifted diamond was 
marked to sell at $1549.00 constitute expert testimony for purposes of Utah's expert witness 
notification statute? 
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies because defendant did not object 
to the store owner's testimony below and he does not argue plain error or exceptional 
Unless otherwise stated, this brief will cite to the current version of the Code. 
Where significant statutory amendments have been made, the applicable version will be 
cited. 
circumstances on appeal. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) 
(appellate court will not review unpreserved claim where appellant does not allege that plain 
error or exceptional circumstances justifies review). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-602, -601, -606 (2003) (retail theft); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (2003) (penalties for theft); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1999) (expert witness notification). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 3,2003, the State charged defendant, Khai Tran, with one count of retail 
theft, a third degree felony. Rl-5. A jury convicted defendant as charged. R34; R91:178. 
The trial court sentenced defendant to zero to five years in prison, with credit for time served. 
R91:184-85. Defendant timely appeals his conviction. R82-83. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
He knew "right off the bat" 
A little after 7:30 p.m., on January 31, 2003, defendant and his friend, Saun Nguyen, 
walked into Cassar Jewelers in Ogden's Newgate Mall. R91:12,26-27,74-75,105. The two 
men momentarily looked at wedding sets, but then moved to a case holding loose gems. 
R91:28, 96. After waiting on other customers, John Pearson, co-owner of the store, greeted 
the men and asked if he could help. R91:29. 
2The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. 
Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 554 (Utah App. 1991). 
2 
Pointing to a marquis-cut diamond in the case, defendant asked to see "that diamond." 
R91:29-30. The chosen diamond had a marked price of $1549.00. R91:33-34, 59. Pearson 
retrieved the diamond, contained in a pouch with a sleeve, and handed it to defendant. 
R91:33-3 8. Standing two to three feet away from the counter, defendant studied the diamond, 
squeezed the tips of the pouch to open it, and began shaking the pouch so that the diamond 
moved towards the opening. R91:38. 
Pearson, worried that defendant might "bolt" with the diamond, repeatedly invited him 
to sit down at the counter, as customers typically did. R91:35-37. Although defendant 
responded by moving forward, he never sat down, and each time "always work[ed] his way 
back" to a few feet from the counter. R91:35-39. 
While talking to his friend, defendant continued to squeeze and shake the pouch. The 
diamond finally fell out into defendant's left hand. R91:35-40. Defendant cupped his left 
hand and put it into his pocket. R91:39-41, 96, 100-01. Defendant then pulled his left hand 
out in a fist R91:41-42, 98. 
While appearing to look at the diamond, defendant said to his friend, "That gives me 
a good idea of what I'm looking for." R91:42. Defendant then placed the pouch on the 
counter with a loose diamond on top, and said, "[I]t fell out." R91:42. 
Pearson knew "right off the bat" that defendant had switched the original diamond with 
a marquis-shaped cubic zirconium. R.91:43, 45, 55-57. "The [real] diamond that they tried 
to switch was a very poorly cut diamond . . . [v]ery skinny and very narrow," such that 
customers would ask Pearson why it looked "so funny." R.91:55-57. Also, Pearson's 
3 
diamond, had an off-center "bowtie effect" - a black line that usually runs down the center 
of a marquis-cut diamond. R91:58. 
In contrast, the manmade cubic zirconium defendant placed on the counter was "a 
perfect cut," "a little fatter . . . more like a football shape," like most marquis diamonds. 
R91:55-57, 59. The cubic zirconium lacked any bowtie effect. R91:58. 
"I must have accidentally put it in my pocket" 
Using a prearranged code word, Pearson signaled the theft to Chad Baird, the other on-
duty salesman. R91:60, 99. In response, Baird and a friend of Pearson's in the store at the 
time, positioned themselves next to defendant and Nguyen to prevent them from running. 
R91:60-61,99-101. Pearson walked around the counter and, standing next to defendant, said, 
"Okay, game's over. Give me my diamond back." R91:63, 101. When defendant feigned 
ignorance, Pearson repeated, "I'm not an idiot. Give me my diamond back." R91:63, 101. 
Defendant reached into his pocket and pulled out Pearson's diamond, along with 
several pieces of costume jewelry. R91:63-64. Defendant explained, "I must have 
accidentally put it in my pocket." R91:63. 
Pearson quickly tested his diamond in a machine, verifying the diamond's authenticity. 
R91:84. Pearson did not test the cubic zirconium because he had "enough experience [to] 
. . . know that [it] . . . wasn't a real diamond."3 R91:85. 
3Chad Baird testified that the substitute diamond was "clearly a cubic zirconium" 
and he, too, could "plainly see the difference in the two." R91:102. 
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Pearson had defendant and Nguyen sit next to a large planter while Pearson summoned 
police. R91:64-67. Before the police arrived, defendant volunteered, "I wasn't trying to steal 
it. I was just trying to match it - my girlfriend sent me down because this is the size diamond 
she wanted. She just told me to come match one up." R91:68-69. Defendant had no response 
when Pearson asked him why he had not just taken out the fake diamond to compare with the 
real one. R91:69. 
"It was just a mistake that I made" 
Officers Garcia and Taylor arrived at Cassar Jewelers within five minutes. R91:71, 
104. After being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant told Officer Garcia that he and his 
brother were jewelry distributors and that his brother had given him some fake diamonds to 
compare with real ones. R91:110-111.4 When Officer Garcia asked defendant why he did 
not just tell the salesman what he wanted to do, defendant "kinda hesitated a little bit and said, 
'It was just a mistake that I made."5 R91:112. Officer Garcia searched defendant and 
discovered several loose fake gems and pieces of costume jewelry. R91:113-15. 
The following morning, Pearson discovered several other pieces of fake jewelry in the 
planter next to where defendant had been seated. R91:76-80. No customers had been in the 
store since Pearson had confronted defendant about the switch. R91:74-76. 
Before trial, the stolen diamond, although originally marked at $1549.00, sold for 
$1450.00. R91-.59-61. 
defendant's brother testified that neither he nor any of defendant's brothers were 
involved in the diamond business. R91:134-35. 
5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that he was entitled to a continuance under Utah's expert notification 
statute because the jewelry store owner testified as an expert regarding the authenticity and 
value of the stolen diamond, and the prosecution had not given him the statutorily-required 
3 0-day s notice of the testimony. Defendant has waived any claim that the jewelry store owner 
testified as an expert because the trial court, at defendant's request, limited the owner's 
testimony to non-expert matters. Defendant expressly agreed that the owner could testify as 
the owner of a jewelry store. He raised no objection to any of the store owner's testimony 
regarding the authenticity or value of the shop-lifted or substitute diamond. 
Even if defendant had preserved his claim, it fails. The store owner's testimony that 
the stolen diamond was marked at $1549.00 and later sold at $1450 did not constitute expert 
testimony. The expert notification statute, therefore, did not apply and defendant was neither 
entitled to 30-days notice nor to a continuance. 
ARGUMENT 
TESTIMONY OF THE RETAIL VALUE OF A SHOP-LIFTED ITEM 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE EXPERT TESTIMONY FOR PURPOSES OF 
UTAH'S EXPERT WITNESS NOTIFICATION STATUTE; 
DEFENDANT WAS THEREFORE NOT ENTITLED TO A 
CONTINUANCE 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1999), Utah's expert notification statute, provides: 
(l)(a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in a 
felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held 
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party intending 
to call the expert witness shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as 
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing. 
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Notice includes "the name and address of the expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy 
of the expert's report." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3(l)(b) (1999). If a party fails to meet the 
above notification requirements, "the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the 
trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony." Utah Code Ann. § 77-
17-3(4)(a)(1999).5 
Defendant asserts that Mr. Pearson was permitted to testify as an expert regarding the 
authenticity of the shop-lifted diamond, the lack of authenticity of the substitute diamond, and 
the value of the stolen diamond. Br. Aplt. 5-7,16-19. He contends that because the State did 
not notify him 30 days before trial that the jewelry store owner would testify as an expert, the 
trial court erred in not granting him a continuance under section 77-17-13. Defendant claims 
he was prejudiced by the lack of notice because value was an element of the crime that the 
State proved only through Pearson's "expert" testimony.6 Br. Aplt. 7, 17-18. 
5Section § 77-17-3(4)(a) was amended effective May 5, 2003, to read: "If the 
defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with the requirements of this 
section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled 
to a continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the 
testimony." (Emphasis added). Defendant cites to the amended version. See Br. Aplt. 
11. However, the trial was held before the 2003 amendment became effective. Because 
the amended version does not apply to this case, this brief cites only to the 1999 version, 
the provision in effect at the time of trial. 
6The value of a stolen item determines the degree of offense committed by a 
defendant. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-606 & 76-6-412(1). A theft is a third degree 
felony if the value of the property stolen "is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(b)(i). Property worth between $300 and $1,000 is a class 
A misdemeanor, while property worth less than $300 is a class B misdemeanor. Id, at § 
76-6-412(l)(c). 
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Defendant has waived any claim that Mr. Pearson testified as an expert because the 
trial court, at defendant's request, limited Pearson's testimony to non-expert matters. 
Defendant expressly agreed that Pearson could testify as the owner of the jewelry store. He 
never objected to any of Pearson's testimony regarding the authenticity of either stone or the 
marked value of the stolen one. Even if defendant had preserved his claim, Pearson's 
testimony that the stolen diamond was marked at $1549.00 and later sold for $1450.00, did 
not constitute expert testimony. Pearson's testimony regarding the sale price of the diamond 
was all that was required to prove value under the retail theft statute. Section 77-17-3, 
therefore, did not apply and the prosecution was not required to give defendant 30 days notice 
of Pearson's testimony. 
A. Proceedings below. 
John Pearson was the State's first witness. R91:12. On direct examination, the 
prosecutor asked Mr. Pearson if he had specialized training in distinguishing between real and 
fake diamonds. R91:12. Defendant immediately objected and requested a bench conference. 
R91:12-13. 
After the jury was excused, defendant cited to section 77-17-13 and argued that he had 
"received no notification of the state's intent to call an expert witness." R91:13-. Defendant 
conceded that Mr. Pearson could "testify as the owner of Cassar's [Jjewelers [that] this 
appears to be the diamond and this appears to be the fake diamond, but if [the prosecution is] 
going to have him give opinion based upon training and experience, specialized training 
. . . [the prosecution is] qualifying] him as an expert." R91:31. 
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The prosecutor responded that Mr. Pearson's contemplated testimony was not "expert" 
testimony. R91:14. "I'm not going to ask him any details about diamonds . . . other than the 
fact that he had a diamond that he had seen on a regular basis in his store, and that that 
diamond was replaced with an obvious fake." R91:14. The prosecutor pointed out that 
defense counsel had been aware from the beginning that "this was a jewelry type situation and 
that Mr. Pearson was involved in this case." R91:14. The prosecutor reiterated that all she 
hoped to elicit from the witness was "I recognize my diamond and I recognize a fake, and this 
is how I recognize it because I have . . . had a couple of classes." R91:14. 
The trial court confirmed with the prosecutor that she intended only to ask Mr. Pearson 
about his observations that "there was a difference in the diamond that was now on the 
counter, and that he could tell a difference between the diamond that was real and the 
diamond that was not." R91:16. 
Defendant again stated that "it is fine to question about observations," but that he 
objected to the prosecution's "trying to get in specialized training, making him an expert." 
R91:18. When the trial court asked whether defendant would object to the witness "making 
an observation that this was a fake diamond," defense counsel replied, "In his opinion as a 
jewelry store owner, no, I'm not gonna object to that . . . but his opinion as a trained -
somebody that's had specialized training, yes I'm gonna object to . . . ." R91:18-19. 
Based on defendant's objection, the trial court limited the prosecutor's examination: 
[T]o the extent that foundation would bolster his testimony as an expert, that 
somehow he stands in a different situation other than as a owner of the store, 
that somehow he's had all this training and would definitely know that this was 
9 
a fake versus a real one, I'm gonna ask you not to lay that foundation because 
that does perhaps elevate this to the . . . arena.. . of an expert or someone that 
would be totally different. 
R91:19. The trial court explained, however, that "[ojwners can give testimony as to value, 
that type of thing." R91:19. "He has some experience in recognizing certainly what was 
. . . the diamond that he gave versus a diamond that may have been substituted. And if he[,] 
based on his observations [,] was able to tell one was real and one wasn't, then I think that'll 
come in." R91:19. 
Over defendant's objection, the trial court also ruled that if defendant "opened the 
door" on cross-examination, the prosecutor could elicit Pearson's training and expertise to 
rebut a claim that he could not tell the difference between the real and fake diamond. R91:20-
21. Upon that ruling, defense counsel moved for a continuance or mistrial, claiming that 
although he knew Mr. Pearson was "a jewelry store owner," he did not "know he had expert 
training." R91:22. The trial court denied defendant's motion, stating, "Let's go ahead with 
the case. And given - given the limitations that I've just placed on . . . bolstering basically 
his qualifications, he's basically testifying as the owner of the store, and his observations." 
R91:22. 
Pearson then testified about the special characteristics of his diamond as opposed to 
defendant's cubic zirconium and how Pearson knew that defendant had replaced the real 
diamond with a fake. R91:30-43, 45, 55-60. Pearson explained that he sold only genuine 
diamonds in his store. R91:34. Pearson gave no testimony regarding the value of his 
diamond other than to testify that it was marked to sell at $ 1549.00 and later actually sold for 
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$1450.00. R91:59-60. Defendant did not object to any of Pearson's testimony as being 
beyond the trial court's ruling limiting his testimony. 
B. Defendant has waived any claim that the witness testified as an expert. 
It is well-settled that "claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346. See also State v. Thomas, 1999 
UT 2, Tf 29, 974 P.2d 269 ("Absent any indication that this issue was raised at trial, it cannot 
be considered for the first time on appeal"); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 
1996) (declining to address claims not raised in the trial court). To preserve an issue for 
appeal, a defendant "must enter an objection on the record that is both timely and specific." 
State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah App. 1993). "The objection must 'be specific 
enough to give the trial court notice of the very error' of which counsel [or defendant] 
complains." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Tolman v. 
Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457,460 (Utah App. 1996)). "The purpose of this rule 
is to allow the trial court the first opportunity to address a claim that it has erred," and, if 
necessary, to expeditiously correct the error. Rangel, 866 P.2d at 611. The preservation rule 
"applies to every claim, including constitutional questions," unless an appellant alleges and 
demonstrates "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, <[} 11. 
Here, defendant objected to Pearson testifying as an expert unless he was given a 
continuance to meet that testimony. Defendant expressly agreed, however, that Pearson could 
testify, "[i]n his opinion as a jewelry store owner," regarding the authenticity of both stones. 
R91:13,18-19. Defendant objected only to Pearson giving an opinion based on "specialized 
11 
training." R91:13, 18-19. The trial court granted defendant the relief he sought by limiting 
Pearson's testimony as defendant had requested. R91:19-22. 
Defendant never objected to Pearson's testimony as exceeding the trial court's ruling. 
Nor has he argued that the trial court committed plain error by not sua sponte determining that 
Pearson's testimony exceeded the court's order. He has therefore waived any claim on appeal 
that Pearson's testimony constituted expert testimony in violation of the trial court's order. 
SeeStatev. Pledger, 896P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (court will not review unpreserved 
claim where appellant does not allege that plain error or exceptional circumstances justifies 
review). 
C. The jewelry store owner's testimony that the stolen diamond was marked at a 
certain price did not constitute expert testimony. 
Even if defendant had preserved his appellate claim, he has not shown that Mr. Pearson 
testified as an expert regarding the value of the stolen diamond. Indeed, defendant's claim 
that Mr. Pearson testified as an expert is based on the erroneous assumption theit the value of 
stolen property can be established only through expert testimony. See Br. Aplt. 19-20. 
Defendant's assumption ignores the plain language of the retail theft statute, under 
which he was charged. Retail theft is defined with respect to the retail of the stolen 
merchandise: 
Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers or causes to be 
carried away or transferred any merchandise displayed, held, stored, or offered 
for sale in a retail mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining such 
merchandise or with the intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the 
possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without paying the retail value 
of such merchandise. 
12 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602(1) (2003) (emphasis added). '"Retail value' means the 
merchant's stated or advertised price of the merchandise." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-601(7). 
"'Merchant' means an owner or operator of any retail mercantile establishment where 
merchandise is displayed, held or offered for sale and includes the merchant's employees, 
servants or agents." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-601(2) (emphasis added). 
In other words, to convict defendant of retail theft, the State had only to prove that 
defendant intended to permanently deprive the merchant, Mr. Pearson, of his diamond, 
"without paying the [diamond's] retail value." To establish the retail value, the State had only 
to put on evidence of the merchant's stated or advertised price. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
601(7). 
Evidence of a merchant's stated or advertised price does not require "scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge." Utah R. Evid. 702. It only requires testimony that 
the merchandise was marked or advertised at a certain price. Thus, anyone who had seen the 
marked price or an advertisement of the marked price could testify as to an item's retail value. 
Here, the prosecution proved the retail value of the stolen diamond with the merchant's 
testimony that it was price-marked at $ 1549.00. R91:59. Mr. Pearson also testified that the 
sleeve containing the diamond listed the price. R91:34. Finally, Mr. Pearson testified that the 
diamond eventually sold for $1450.00. R91:59. None of this testimony, which established 
the retail value of the diamond as more than $1000.00 but less than $5000.00, was expert 
testimony. Rather, it was lay fact testimony based on the personal knowledge of Mr. Pearson. 
The same testimony could have been given by any employee or customer who had seen the 
13 
price on the diamond or who had purchased the diamond. That defense counsel did not 
specifically object to this testimony only reinforces the fact that Mr. Pearson's testimony 
regarding value did not amount to expert testimony. 
Defendant nevertheless argues that the State could prove the value of the stolen 
diamond only by establishing that "the store's diamond was authentic, and the [defendant's 
substitute diamond was counterfeit." Br. Aplt. 18. He reasons that if defendant "was 
intending to substitute a real diamond for a real diamond of comparable value, the theft 
amount would be nominal, and consequently the [d]efendant would be convicted of a Class 
B misdemeanor." Br. Aplt. 17-18. 
This argument again ignores the plain language of the retail theft and related statutes. 
As explained, the State only had to prove the retail value of the stolen item and that defendant 
did not intend to pay the item's retail value. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602( 1). The value 
of an item stolen from a retailer is based solely on the price that the merchant offers to sell the 
property. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-601(7). 
Section 76-6-606 provides that a violation of section 76-6-602(1) is punished in 
accordance with section 76-6-412(1). As stated in footnote 6, supra, that section provides that 
the degree of offense for retail and other types of theft is determined based solely on the value 
of the item stolen. Thus, under the plain language of the applicable statutes, the degree of the 
offense for retail theft is determined by the retail value of the stolen merchandise, not the 
difference between the retail value and an inferior substitute. 
14 
In any event, that defendant's diamond was a fake was indisputably established by non-
expert testimony. First, Mr. Pearson testified it was an obvious fake. R91:85. Second, Chad 
Baird testified defendant's diamond was obviously a cubic zirconium. R91:102. Finally, and 
most importantly, defendant acknowledged to Pearson, Baird, and Officer Garcia that his 
diamond was a fake that he intended to compare with the real diamonds in the shop. R91:68-
69,102-03,110-11. 
In sum, slyly substituting a cubic zirconium for a diamond priced at $1549.00 in a 
jewelry store admits of only one conclusion: that the defendant did not intend to pay the retail 
value of the stolen merchandise. This conclusion requires no expertise or specialized training. 
Because Mr. Pearson's testimony regarding the price of his diamond was not expert 
testimony, the prosecutor was not required under section 77-17-13 to give the defense 30 days 
notice. Accordingly, the defense was not entitled a continuance. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this a. day of •ftpJL _, 2004. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
INE; 
SISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-601, -602, -606 (2003) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (2003) 




As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Merchandise* means any personal property displayed, held or 
offered for sale by a merchant. 
(2) "Merchant" means an owner or operator of any retail mercantile 
establishment where merchandise is displayed, held or offered for sale and 
includes the merchant's employees, servants or agents. 
(3) "Minor" means any unmarried person under 18 years of age. 
(4) "Peace officer" has the same meaning as provided in Title 53, 
Chapter 13, Peace Officer Classifications. 
(5) "Premises of a retail mercantile establishment" includes, but is not 
limited to, the retail mercantile establishment; any common use areas in 
shopping centers and all parking lots or areas set aside for the benefit of 
those patrons of the retail mercantile establishment. 
(6) "Retail mercantile establishment" means any place where merchan-
dise is displayed, held, or offered for sale to the public. 
(7) "Retail value" means the merchant's stated or advertised price of the 
merchandise. 
(8) "Shopping cart" means those push carts of the types which are 
commonly provided by grocery stores, drug stores, or other mercantile 
establishments or markets for the use of the public in transporting 
commodities in stores and markets from the store to a place outside the 
store. 
(9) "Under-ring" means to cause the cash register or other sales record-
ing device to reflect less than the retail value of the merchandise. 
76-6-602. Retail theft, acts constituting. 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers or causes to be 
carried away or transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or 
offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment with the intention of 
retaining such merchandise or with the intention of depriving the mer-
chant permanently of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise 
without paying the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, price tag, marking, indicia of 
value or any other markings which aid in determining value of any 
merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale, in a retail mercan-
tile establishment and attempts to purchase such merchandise personally 
or in consort with another at less than the retail value with the intention 
of depriving the merchant of the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(3) Transfers any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale 
in a retail mercantile establishment from the container in or on which 
such merchandise is displayed to any other container with the intention of 
depriving the merchant of the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(4) Under-rings with the intention of depriving the merchant of the 
retail value of the merchandise; or 
(5) Removes a shopping cart from the premises of a retail mercantile 
establishment with the intent of depriving the merchant of the possession, 
use or benefit of such cart. 
76-6-606, Penalty. 
An act of theft committed in violation of this part shall be punished in 
accordance with Subsection 76-6-412(1). 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i)' value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(iij property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 
76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is 
less than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, 
or any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property 
taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, 
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal 
raised for commercial purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less 
than $300. 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or 
commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(l)(b)(iii), is civilly 
liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
77-17-13. Expert testimony generally — Notice require-
ments. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify 
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing 
held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party 
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon 
as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the 
hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's 
curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report. 
(2) (a) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed 
testimony. 
(b) If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not 
adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed 
testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that 
opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide to the opposing 
party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient 
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the 
testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when 
available. 
(3) (a) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party 
receiving notice shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom 
the party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the 
name and address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. 
If available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided to the other 
party. 
(b) If the rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the report does 
not adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed 
testimony, or in the event the rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party 
intending to call the rebuttal witness shall provide a written explanation 
of the witness's anticipated rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the 
opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed 
by a copy of any report prepared by any rebuttal expert when available. 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution foils to meet the requirements of 
this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the 
trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the 
result of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall 
impose appropriate sanctions. 
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary 
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of 
the expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by 
the expert at the preliminary hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary 
hearing shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's 
curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at 
which the expert may be called as an expert witness. 
